the most coherent account of the belt's formation. He defines the belt as an array of distinct industrial regions comprising outer-ring cities and industrial towns clustered around metropolitan centers. A spatially differentiated process of cumulative causation, operating at a continental scale, produced local and regional specializations on the back of initial advantages. Between 1860 and 1880 manufacturers within the belt began to serve multiregional and national markets, and discrete regional systems (in terms of demand linkages) became integrated into a continental economy. By 1880, 15 regional metropolises dominated U.S. manufacturing, and clear signs of manufacturing specialization were discernible (Meyer 1987) . Metropolitan centers provided finance, wholesale, warehouse, and transport services for manufacturers and served as innovation centers and information nodes. Between 1830 and 1860 the belt grew from small industrial beginnings in Atlantic coast states to cover an area marked by Minneapolis and St. Louis in the west, Toronto and Montreal in the north, and Louisville and Cincinnati in the south. Migration and urbanization, westward frontier expansion, and railroad and telegraph construction fueled industrial development within a westwardexpanding industrial belt. Initially, growth processes generated discrete regional industrial systems, as replica industrial facilities were built in new locations, producing a generic urban industrial landscape despite the belt's apparent diversity (Meyer 1990b ). In the period 1860-80, however, discrete regional industrial systems were functionally integrated into a continental geography of market and resource supply regions. By 1880 the belt integrated a continentwide set of periphery regions. The dynamics of these interregional core-periphery relationships are controversial (Earle 1992 Laxer 1989 ), but, because of them, the processes generating the belt were spatially confined. Beginning in the 1880s, a second industrial revolution associated with steel, electrical energy, and university-trained engineers altered the spatial dynamics of North American industry, but by 1880 we can expect interregional trade on a large scale.
In this interpretation, the relationship between urban and industrial form within the belt remains poorly theorized, and the nature and spatial extent of supply linkages remain unknown. The belt comprised diverse industrial and urban locales set in a "dominant landscape of farms and forests" (Meyer 1990b, 251) . Industrial landscapes included various industrial districts within metropolitan centers (Muller and Groves 1979; Hiebert 1990; Pudup 1983; Scranton 1983 Scranton , 1989 Muller 1989 ) but also satellite industrial towns, company towns (Mosher 1995) , single-industry resource towns with processing industries, and industrial countrysides of small factory villages (Vance 1990; Prude 1983; McCann 1988; Wynn 1987) . Workshops remained important even with the development of factory organization, machinofacture, and wage work.
MANUFACTURING BELT IN 1880
The belt's internal diversity complicates the metro-centered region model. So far, manufacturers' supply linkages have not been studied to confirm these city-centered regional industrial systems. Analysis focuses on the proximity of plants to each other and to transport lines, power sites, and labor sheds, or on indicators of urban importance: population size, headquarters locations, news sources, and bank correspondence. Connections among these urban functions and the manufacturing establishments themselves tend to be neglected (but see McCann 1994). Firms located within industrial cities may have enjoyed urbanization economies, but perhaps agglomeration economies were more elusive. The many establishments dispersed across the countryside (Pudup 1987 ) must have managed regional and extraregional linkages, yet their own communities offered few suppliers. Establishments located outside metropolitan centers and outside the integrated networks of industrial corporations have received little attention, because they are said to have been rendered obsolete by the corporation and mass production. Long-distance trade predates industrialization and made the industrial revolution's ramifications more significant (Braudel 1984; Wallerstein 1979) . That early manufacturing was part of local economies that were unified and somehow escaped external influences is at odds with these findings.
Perhaps manufacturers' supplies came chiefly from firms in metropolitan centers, but the jury is out. There is no verdict for either the period of westward industrial expansion to 1880 or the subsequent period of continental market integration. In the absence of a manufacturer's-eye view of connectivity, research has revealed many types of regional and local groupings of manufacturers, but it has left the rationales for them assumed. Specialized manufacturing suppliers may have emerged with national or beltwide markets. Alternatively, did the belt comprise a series of metrocentered "industrial districts," each with its own agglomeration economies, local linkages, governance systems, regulatory regime, milieu of innovation and trust, and work culture? The idea that discrete regional industrial systems operated around each metropolitan center needs to be tested in these terms.
One Large Industrial District
It is hard to conceive of the belt as one large industrial district. The idea plays havoc with our ideas about globalization, the slow pace at which businesses became vertically integrated and multinational in scope, and the gradual annihilation of space by time. In terms of regulation, each state and province had its own industrial policies (Jarrell 1988; McCurdy 1978) . The belt is subdivided by international and linguistic borders. Both U.S. and Canadian government jurisdictions extended over wide territories beyond the belt, and neither developed many truly national institutions by 1880. Production costs were not uniform over the belt's large territory (Bater and Walker 1970; Kerr 1987) . Strike activity and unionization were localized within the belt (Earle 1992), and wage rates varied across the United States (Earle and Hoffman 1976, 1980) . Manufacturing involved few blueprints or detailed engineering specifications, and neither transnational corporations nor university-trained mechanical engineers coordinated transfers of designs, machine tools, and practices among establishments (Noble 1977) . Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of the belt as a whole functioning as an innovative milieu or offering external agglomeration economies and the face-to-face contacts and institutions which are thought to guarantee trust within industrial districts.
"Milieu" can apply at the scale of the belt. Milieu comprises networks beyond the firm's ownership, associated social relationships of production and management, common instrumental goals, a shared work culture, and a high level of organizational synergy (Castells 1989, 72) . But "in principle, the diffusion of science and technology do not require spatial proximity," so that 73 ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY "milieu" is not necessarily defined by spatial proximity. However, "in the case of information technology industries, spatial proximity is a necessary material condition for the existence of such milieux, because of the nature of interaction in the innovation process" (Castells 1989, 82-83). Outside the context of late-twentieth-century information technology industries, spatial proximity might not be a defining characteristic of innovative milieus. Indeed, many aspects of industrial practice, trust, work culture, and innovation were widely shared among manufacturers by 1860. Robert Allen coined the term "collective innovation" to describe the ways nineteenth-century firms "collectively invent in the course of routine production and then make available to their competitors the results of their new designs and techniques" (Newell 1986, 5) . Generally inventors found it difficult to hide their technical advantage from would-be copiers. Through combinations of learningby-doing, copying, licensing, and patent purchase, manufacturers accessed technology with or without the permission of competitors (Winder 1994 (Winder , 1995 . Long-distance linkages involved license agreements, subcontracting, branch plants, strategic alliances, and credit relationships among manufacturers. Firms transferred patterns and drawings among factories, and many went much further. In the 1840s, for example, the Baldwin Locomotive Works operated around a 60-day production schedule, with materials shipped to Philadelphia from subcontracted specialist firms under "a rudimentary just-in-time inventory system," "with bills of lading arriving in advance of the shipments" to facilitate production planning, and with payment by notes of credit with terms of up to four months (Brown 1995, 14-16) . Subcontractors held Baldwin's drawings and specifications on file and made finished parts to order. Baldwin ordered parts and materials from across Pennsylvania and from New York State, Baltimore, Boston, Connecticut, and the United Kingdom. "Baldwin's ties to this constellation of companies had both a technical basis, dependent upon the quality of their products, and a financial aspect, and the two became intertwined" (Brown 1995, 14) . Thus, simple governance structures covered early, long-distance supply relationships, and perhaps, if the belt comprised an innovative milieu, then it could have functioned as a vast supply region for manufacturers.
Industries Built Their Own Networks
If each industry built its own network of suppliers, then the belt may well be a nonsense that should be abandoned. Walker (1988) proposes that economic geography be reconceived as the study of a variety of locales integrated in networks of both dispersed and localized establishments. New industries create their own geography by making factors of production come to them. Industrial establishments can be treated as territorial complexes, ranging from the workplace, itself a geographic cluster, through to the vertically disintegrated production complex and territorial growth centers, from which established industries are dispersed to capture new markets (Storper and Walker 1989 (Meyer 1987) . By the 1880s the Burden iron mills employed 1,000 workers in bolt, rivet, railroad spike, and wrought iron bar production, while Corning and Winslow employed 1,500 workers in bar and sheet iron manufacture (Walkowitz 1978) . Ostensibly, these enterprises had a large local market among stove makers, as did clothing manufacturers, and Albany and Troy made up a large, functionally integrated, industrial agglomeration. (Fig. 3) 
Both the Hudson-Mohawk agglomeration and the New York-centered industrial region figure prominently in Filley Stove's linkages

Toward a Geography of Nineteenth-Century Supply Linkages
The two firms studied here display remarkable arrays of long-and short-distance linkages. Iron, steel, castings, and finished components were sourced from well outside the firms' immediate regional industrial systems. Both firms ordered parts, repairs, materials, goods, and ser- The spatial extent of the Harris and Filley supply networks seems at odds with concepts of milieu, governance, regulation, embeddedness, and trust developed for late-twentieth-century manufacturing contexts (Zucker 1986 ). These economic geography terms do not translate well into nineteenth-century contexts. Nineteenthcentury licenses, subcontracts, and orders took a great deal for granted, especially the specifications of the goods themselves. Firms depended upon a common repertoire of skills, techniques, materials, and designs and had to possess basic process technology, but they could produce various designs using purchased components. Collective innovation involved learning by doing and copying from other machines, but also apprenticeships and transfers of technology from master to apprentice and among kin; searches of Scientific American and the Patent Office Recorder; employing consultant mechanics, pattern makers, or patent agents; relying on machine tool and parts suppliers for innovations; taking out licenses; and establishing spin-off plants. Licensing was far more common than in the United Kingdom (Macleod 1992) . Collective innovation and recourse to fitting obviated the need for precise specifications and strict interchangeability for most foundries and machine shops. Customary work practices, like production for seasonal markets and seasonal works closures, meant that firms ordered in anticipation of demand and resorted to stockpiles. This situation is a far cry from "production subcontracting" (Walker 1988 , 389-91), but it did facilitate long-distance supply in manufacturing.
Practices were developed, diffused, unpacked, and tinkered with across the continent and were backed by governance and regulatory structures that have been obscured in most accounts. Key regulatory institutions included patent offices and departments of agriculture. In both
MANUFACTURING BELT IN 1880
Canada and the United States the patent office and census bureau were initially part of the department of agriculture, and all three agencies provided services for manufacturers. They stimulated and registered innovation, educated and trained workers, protected and enumerated manufacturers, arranged exhibitions of manufactured goods, and offered prizes to manufacturers (Winder 1995) . Patent offices granted and enforced patent rights, oversaw transfers of technology under licenses, and advertised innovations through office journals (Cooper 1991) .
By the 1870s manufacturers shared business services, institutional and social networks, and informal credit networks. Business services, like Dunn and Bradstreet's creditworthiness appraisals and railroad, postal, and telegraph services, operated widely throughout the belt from an early date. Family networks and alliances provided trust for enterprises and coordinated production in distant establishments through separate firms, branch plants, partnerships, or licensed enterprises. Owners mobilized as a class (Veblen 1953 [1899]; Kirkland 1956 ). While each town had one or more circles of business people (Ingham 1991) , owners also networked at regional levels and had national aspirations and interests. Manufacturers' associations emerged as early as the 1860s (Clark 1939) , and cartels tried to set prices and allocate market territories and production at national conventions. Metropolitan finance houses provided credit, but manufacturers relied upon financial interdependence with suppliers and purchasers.
Machine tool manufacturers transferred innovations across industries and pushed for standardization of industrial practices. The U.S. armories stimulated machine tool development and diffused the "American system of manufactures" (Rosenberg 1982; Hounshell 1981 Hounshell , 1984 , but the significance of these transfers is sometimes exaggerated (Best 1990, 29-45) . Hoke (1990) has warned that this was not the only way in which interchangeability was achieved, and Brown (1995) shows how one influential capital equipment builder achieved interchangeability without recourse to the armories. Systematic diffusion routes may have emerged for machine tool technology, and some machine tool producers-for instance, William Sellers (Table 4) Skilled workers registered in international trades unions and schooled in practical science underpinned manufacturing production. Migration, featuring frequent moves and return migration, created permanent links between sending and receiving communities, so that "In the extreme While these phenomena mark an era of capitalist production, they also mark a geographic organization of manufacturing effort. Perhaps two broad geographies of innovation and diffusion can be identified with this evolving milieu. First, as the center of industrial activities shifted westward and the boundaries of the belt were set through processes of specialization and localization, a foundry frontier operated (Winder 1995 When conceived as a container of manufacturing, the North American Manufacturing Belt remains a chaotic conception. While it was a denser mat of manufacturing establishments and rail lines than found in the rest of the continent, the belt was at once a manufacturing landscape and a farm landscape. It can be subdivided into regional industrial districts with metropolitan centers, and, through processes of localization and specialization, the belt is riven by local, regional, and national variations. As a geographic outcome, the belt does not itself reveal the nature of manufacturers' interactions. They can only be captured through analysis of the linkages developed by indicative companies at particular moments. Such analysis supports the idea of the belt as a functioning industrial region: by 1870 manufacturers shared network, regulatory, and governance structures at the scale of the belt.
However, the canon of early "industrial district" names emerging in the debates over new industrial districts and flexible manufacturing systems (Piore and Sabel 1984 versus Scott and Storper 1992) cannot stand as summaries of old modes of industrial organization on their own. When new work (Amin and Robins 1990) demythologizes the currently emerging geography of flexible accumulation, the mythology of a more cosy, local, and communitarian industrial past persists, indeed is generated (Gertler 1992) . Propinquity can foster the trust, regular meetings, and socialization which are vital to disintegrated networks and can generate agglomeration economies, but propinquity is not a necessary condition for linkage relationships. Local and distant industrial interactions were mutually constitutive. Some studies cast disintegrated networks over large territories (Christopherson and Storper 1986) , and besides, proximity may lead to competition as well as to cooperation. Town settings may be divided by conflict, leading to desires for escape, resistance, repression, or control. While the nature of and context for proximate connections are important objects of economic geography inquiry, current research narrowly focuses on clusters of establishments. Before the rise of the vertically integrated industrial corporation, manufacturers built and participated in extensive, disintegrated supply networks. If it is to be useful as a geographic metaphor, the North American Manufacturing Belt is best conceived as a manifestation of these early linkages.
